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21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR WORKING GROUP (STALIN)

SUBJECT: Informal Comments on the Soviet Nationality Vulnerability

1. It appears that most of the decisions reached affecting the development of psychological warfare against the USSR have not given proper emphasis to the exploitation of the non-Russian ethnic groups within the Soviet Union. This has been largely due to the contention that any interest on our part in the non-Russian peoples will arouse the antagonism of the Russian people who may interpret our actions as designed to dismember the Soviet Union. This is the roadblock which has stymied what should be one of the prime targets in U.S. psychological warfare against the USSR. That this roadblock is fancied rather than real can be shown by a consideration of some aspects of the problem which have been given far too little attention. One of the cardinal principles of psychological warfare is that every available weapon should be used and that no single tactic, weapon, medium or audience should be relied upon exclusively. What is needed is a multifaceted approach or the use of a number of approaches which will facilitate the driving of as many wedges as possible into the Soviet system. It is essential to realize that one approach does not preclude the simultaneous use of another approach. What is suggested, therefore, is not the use of Soviet minority propaganda always and everywhere but its use where and when appropriate to the fullest possible extent.

2. Much of the available information indicates that the weakest links within the Soviet chain of control are represented by the various national minorities who have, in the past, manifested strong desires to break away from the Russian rule. Practically all of these ethnic groups are located along the periphery of the USSR. Many of them are ethnically, linguistically, culturally different from the Great Russian, and despite the Soviet efforts to suppress their national aspirations still continue to display cohesive national pride. The fact that national differences persist in the Soviet Union has been clearly illustrated by the speeches made by the prominent Soviet leaders. Despite this, however, the psychological effort so far failed to encourage the development of national aspirations in the minority areas, or attempt to widen the gap between the regime and these groups.

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3. However, a change in this policy has recently been inaugurated with the approval of PSB D-45 as NSC 158. This document states, "A sub-target of particular interest for this line of attack (that the Soviet empire is beginning to crumble) is the minds of nationalistically oriented groups in the republics of the USSR contiguous to the European satellites." This indicates an awareness that the minority areas can be appealed to separately insofar as they are nationalistically oriented, but it does not go further into the subject. In view of this fact, it is strongly recommended that our policy toward the national minority peoples of the USSR be stated in terms of a broad new approach which will encourage fuller exploitation of the potential dissidence in these areas.

4. The following are some of the principal features which should be utilized in developing an intensified campaign aimed primarily at the non-Russian target areas in the Soviet Union:

a. It should make evident that the United States Government is not in a position to guarantee either the inviolability of the Soviet Russian Empire or the national independence of any of the non-Russian peoples.

b. It should pursue a careful course making no specific promises to any non-Russian group, but it should capitalize upon every aspect of Soviet nationality policy which can be used to embarrass the Kremlin.

c. For psychological warfare purposes the enemy should be defined in terms of the Soviet system, the Party bosses, the Soviet police state, the dictatorship of the Party yarkbushka, etc.

d. For non-Russians the enemy need not and should not be the Russian people, except possibly by implication. For non-Russians the enemy should be the Kremlin and its lackeys, the centralist Party and government apparatuses, Communist tyranny and centralism, and, on occasion, possibly Moscow itself but certainly not explicitly the Russian people.

e. A psychological warfare approach to the non-Russians should seek to capitalize upon those aspects of the Soviet system which tend to relegate them to the category of second-class citizens. It should give emphasis to the non-representative nature (from a nationality point of view) of the All-Union organs and should stress the under-representation of the non-Russians in the Moscow Council of People's Ministers and in the Politburo

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f. It should remind the non-Russians of their great cultural heritage and their continual struggle against all oppressors, Tsarist as well as Bolshevik. In this context good use could be made of the heroic fight in the minority areas against the early Bolshevik armies and, later, against the cruelties of the collectivization period. It should utilize the Bolshevik crimes of Genocide against the minority areas. Ukrainian emigre leaders claim to have proof that the great famine of 1931-32 was the result of conscious effort on the part of the regime to subdue the upsurge of nationalist feeling which accompanied the strong resistance to collectivization. Also, the wartime and postwar repressive measures taken against the minorities, the killing and deportation of the Volga Germans, Crimean Tartars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, Karachais and Ruthenians should be recalled and emphasized.


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JUL 21 1953

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